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Abstract
A notion of delegated causality is introduced here. This subtle kind of
causality is dual to interventional causality. Delegated causality elucidates
the causal role of dynamical systems at the “edge of chaos”, explicates
evident cases of downward causation, and relates emergent phenomena to
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem. Apparently rich implications are noticed
in biology and Chinese philosophy.
1 Introduction
Living organisms, ecosystems, human minds, societies, economic markets are
widely recognized as extraordinary complex systems. They are impressively
organized and possess properties that are hardly reducible to qualities of
physical matter. Thereby they seem to contradict the reductionistic paradigm
of fundamental causation from underlying physical processes. As yet, satisfying
explanation of emerging coherent organization is a comparable challenge for re-
ductionist and holistic philosophies [13], [45]. Even if the reductionist approach
continues to deliver outstanding results in physics, chemistry, molecular biology,
neuropsychology, much deeper understanding of living [105], [85] and conscious
[59], [114] agencies may require an uneasy paradigm change [64], after all.
I introduce a concept that can simplify and unify analysis of intricate causal
relations in complex systems to a remarkable extent. This concept of delegated
causality should clarify much about emergence of whole new phenomena [17],
spontaneous order [57], synergy [19], functionality [2], purpose and intention
[22]. If the new conception indeed refines established specialist perspectives, it
will be worth revisiting sporadic revivals of Emergentism [17, p. 9–26], post-
Enlightenment rationalist skepticism [17, p. 114], classical Greek teleologies
[2, p. 7–30]. The most rigorous contemporary relevance of the new perspective
is to physics of emergence [72], symmetry breaking [1], [81], thermodynamics
[98], [31], and to information-theoretic measure of causal influence [46], [113].
A comprehensive overview of the vast, growing literature on complex
systems, self-organization, emergence would not serve the purpose of this article
to introduce delegated causality. This simple but subtle, overlooked kind of
causality is provoked (figuratively speaking) by critical dynamical systems with
rich behavior and moderate sensitivity to the environment. The scope of my
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abstracted terminology will become clear with the introduction of methodology
(M1)–(M3) in §3 of analyzing causal interactions. Evident implications of
delegated causality will be demonstrated by a brief account of evolutionary
biology (in §5) and a reference to Chinese philosophy (in §6).
This spirited article would be presentable to a scientific version of the TV
show “The X-Factor” [40]. My argumentation is not deep formally, as the chief
purpose is to justify the new concept by a few evocative arguments, agreeable
examples, and links to existing ideas. I start by reassessing contemporary
modeling of complex systems in §2. The fresh kind of causality is introduced
formally in §3. Section 4 examines physical reductionism in the new light, and
relates emergence, downward causation to Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem [35].
The later sections deliberate a few compelling (though not entirely comfortable)
implications. All together, this article is gradually making a holistic argument
for a new comprehensive view by building up the context for the integrating
Section 7.
2 Complex systems
Natural complex systems are studied under many frameworks: self-organization
[3], [27], complex adaptive systems [79], [49], autopoiesis [74], dissipative
structures [98], self-organized criticality [4], [119], etc. The models are
often based on non-linear dynamical systems, their attractors, non-equilibrium
thermodynamics [31], [63], phase transitions [8], scaling analysis [122], cellular
automata [127], [68], variation and selection mechanisms [43], [116], systems
theory [117], [13], developmental frameworks [103], [18], information dynamics
[69]. Phenomenology at the center of attention includes spontaneous increase of
order [47], [57], emergence of coherent global behaviors from local interactions
[95], adaptation to environment perturbations. Applicable distinction between
self-organization and emergence is put forward in [23].
Autonomy, decentralized control, interactive closure are often among defin-
ing features of complex systems [74], [83]. But the autonomy assumption
should not be idealized, especially when considering causation in actual complex
phenomena. Reflections in this article suggest that behaviors (of constituting
agents or the whole system) which amount to control sharing or transfer can be
very far reaching.
It will help clarity here to contrast various complex systems on the two-
dimensional spectrum that combines interactivity with the environment and
homogeneity of constituents; see Figure 1. Living organisms are highly non-
homogeneous and experience variable pressure (often self-inflicted) from the
environment. Their biological and physical organization is nested hierarchical
[104]:
[ organism [ organs [ tissues [ cells [ biomolecules [ atoms [ . . . ] ] ] ] ] ] ];
and they live in similarly nested hierarchical environments:
[ [ [ [ [ [ [ organisms ] flocks ] habitats ] ecosystems ] biosphere ] planet ] . . . ].
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Figure 1: The two-dimensional spectrum of interactivity with the environment
and homogeneity of complex systems.
General heterogeneous adaptive systems are mainly organized in a hierarchal
way as outlined by Simon [107]. Intense, diverse interactivity between levels
facilitates growth and adaptation. Let P denote the spectral corner representing
these systems.
Let Q denote the opposite spectral corner in Figure 1. Do we find phase
transitions of homogeneous matter there? Their unfolding depends on a few
macro-parameters such as temperature, and the environment influences them
once it is included in a model. Similarly, chaotic dynamical systems are highly
sensitive to perturbations. Hence deviations from deterministic trajectories
are inevitable once a bit of environment exists. Dynamics with a finite time
singularity [54] will inevitably change before the singularity. Exponentially
growing dynamics are likely to meet boundary limitations as well.
Are there deep causal implications of this practically unavoidable environ-
mental influence, particularly when the system happens to be fine-tuned to be
influenced? Does this perceptive condition allow genuine downward causation
from emergent entities? At least, can these queries be resolved for emergent
phenomena near the corner Q, where reduction to basic physical causes seems
to be assured? This article starts to address these questions.
Physical reduction is practically ineffectual near the corner P . The renowned
biologist Mayr writes [76, Ch. 4]: “the physiochemical approach is totally sterile
in evolutionary biology”, and ”analysis is continued downward only as long as it
yields useful new information”. Furthermore, Mayr cites Popper’s harsh critique
[96, p. 269, 281]: “as a philosophy, reductionism is a failure ... we live in a
universe of emergent novelty; of a novelty which, as a rule, is not completely
reducible to any of the preceding stages.” If physical reductionism is tenable after
all, it is extremely deeply masked near the corner P . I reckon that this masking
is done by layers of delegated causality.
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3 Delegated causation
We affirm our focus by the following three definitions. They suggest a non-
reductive perspective where the focus is on potential interactions between
dynamical processes rather than mathematical behavior of a single dynamical
model. The first definition characterizes those (continuous or discrete) dynam-
ical systems or their equilibria, bifurcations, critical phases, “edge of chaos”
conditions [118], [57] that are “waiting to be perturbed”, figuratively speaking.
Definition 1 A dynamical system (or its state) is primed if it can exhibit
complex, potentially utilitarian behaviors depending on moderate adjustment of
boundary conditions.
This definition may seem unsatisfactory because of several subjective terms.
However, the hint of subjectivity and external references are important features
of the definition. Primed dynamical systems are to be considered not in isolation
but under influence from each other and the environment. They passively,
reactively follow the laws of physics, boundary conditions, perturbations. Most
dynamical systems can be considered as primed if potential interactions with
other systems are sufficiently interesting. Definite examples of non-primed
systems would be chaotic systems or those in a thermodynamic equilibrium.
Once feedback loops between intricate reactions and triggers of various
primed systems materialize, an elaborate cybernetic or evolutionary system may
come out. Let us use an economic metaphor for the full spectrum of relative,
relational configurations of this kind.
Definition 2 A broad market is a set of primed dynamical systems, triggering
influences and potential reactions between them.
Extending the economic metaphor, we may refer to sensitivities of a primed
dynamical system as its demand, and to the driving effect as supply. A broad
market may be structured into hierarchical [107], [104] or cybernetic modules,
or dominated by an exchange regime of that supply and demand.
Definition 3 The causal relation between a primed dynamical system and an
external, emergent or self-organized influence that drives the dynamical system
by a moderate force of interaction is called delegated causation.
The “moderate force” here is defined in the capability context of driving
influences. Their dynamic realization is beside the main point. Just as operative
features of supply are fairly unimportant in marketing and commerce, the causal
relation is not defined by the substance of influence factors. I discuss possible
dynamic nature of driving influences at the end of §6.
These definitions make most sense for complex systems near the spectral
corner P in Figure 1. Emergent wonders near the corner Q may play special
roles in broad markets, as we can recognize them in computer hardware, inside
smartphone screens. But the meaning of cause delegation within their internal
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homogeneous “markets” requires further interpretation, as I briefly discuss in
the next section.
Delegated causation ought to play important roles in realistic complex
systems, and it should be included in the modeling. Its radical openness [14]
discourages modeling of complex phenomena by single dynamical systems. On
the other hand, delegated causation allows to explicate cybernetic links, tipping
points, feedback loops. The following methodological steps of analyzing a single
delegated interaction must be useful:
(M1) Identify the primed dynamical system in the interaction. Determine its
sensitivity to perturbations, and possible reactions to perturbations.
(M2) Identify the perturbing influences; describe their mechanism.
(M3) Describe the context, the broad market of the interaction.
This methodology is illustrated in Table 2 in §5 by series of biological examples.
The factor (M2) can be identified as an interventional cause. I view (M1) and
(M2) as a dual pair of delegated and interventional causations. In the common
language, “delegation” describes plausibly the cases when (M1) is strong, while
“intervention” describes the cases when (M2) dominates. I use the language of
delegation in the abstract and general sense of the causal factor (M1) in any
interaction.
Layers of delegated causality signify systems with great dynamical depth [25].
Measures of Kolmogorovian sophistication [84] are promising for quantifying
system complexity. Our perspective recommends perturbative analysis of
dynamical systems and complexity measures, because significance of primed
systems lies in their interactive potential.
Delegated causality amounts to a significant case of Deacon’s specific absence
[24], [17, p. 119] as a “pulling” causal force. Causal roles of constrained
absences, virtual demands, “pregnant” [104, §9] opportunities merit good
appreciation. For example, early stages of the British industrial revolution were
much stimulated by specific needs of textile, iron, and mining industries [26].
On the other hand, dynamical laws and initial conditions enjoy the respectful
status of causes. But chaotic dynamics and causality delegation undermine
that status. If an attractor, an equilibrium, or a self-organized state is reached
regardless of initial conditions, what is exactly a cause?
4 Physical reductionism
Openness of delegated causality conforms well with Pearl’s empirical analysis
[92] of causation in terms of interventions and counterfactuals. Interventions
are “actions as external entities, originating from outside our theory, not as a
mode of behavior within the theory” [93]. Causative interventions on primed
dynamical systems (and possible malfunctions as reverse interventions) must be
pivotal features of complex systems.
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Our first weighty thesis is this: delegated causation offers a conceptual
mechanism how micro-scale dynamics results in empirical causation from macro-
level agencies in terms of Pearl’s causal calculus [92] and Hoel’s causal emergence
[46]. Here is one rationale formulated in the economic terminology: complex
events are better temporally correlated with appearance of supply rather than
with an onset of demand, commonly. A row of falling dominos can be interpreted
as a prototypical example. It would be instructive to relate sensitivities of micro-
level dynamics and effective information [46] measures in a compelling example
of a “smoothly” emergent phenomenon.
As a mechanism of downward causation, delegated causality often entails
environmental influence. Other proposed mechanism of downward causation
via environmental interaction is practopoietic cycle [86, §2.6].
Our second weighty thesis refers to Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem [35].
Delegated causality has a self-contradictory flavor of a Go¨delian paradox [50] in
the causality language. This messes up basic principles for physicalism [60], and
Kim’s argument [59] against non-reductive physicalism. In particular, the causal
closure principle says that if a physical event has a cause, it has a physical cause
[17, p. 199], and the exclusion principle states that no single event can have two
independent sufficient causes [60, p. 41]. Kim’s conclusion is that non-physical
(say, mental) events can have no causal power. In contrast, delegated causality
provokes causal, informational contribution from external agents or from an
emerging organization, even if delegation is not ideal. Sufficiency of physical
causation is debatable then. Delegated causality clarifies inevitability of causal
parity [120] and levels of explanation. It furnishes hierarchical dynamics, which
in turn reinvigorates Aristotle’s four categories of material, formal, efficient and
final causes [18], [104, §9].
Incidentally, Popper invoked Go¨del’s theorem in his argument [96] against
reductionism. By a similar reference to Go¨del’s incompleteness, Rosen [101] re-
pudiated theoretic formalization of life. Kim’s epiphenomenal implications have
been countered by interventional [106] and counterfactual [71] argumentation.
Causality and reduction in emergent phenomena are customarily analyzed
in terms of supervenience [9], [109], [17, p. 189–243]: the principle that entities
with the same micro-level properties will have the same macro-level properties.
A supervenience is often defined by a coarse-graining map from physical micro-
states to emergent macro-level states.
Delegated causality amounts to engaging external information, possibly
entailing an externalist [16], [78] propensity to expand the supervenience base
of micro-states beyond memorization, representation. This propensity can
be quickly consummated in complex systems near the corner P , making a
supervenience analysis doubtful. For example, an animal may habitually follow
certain external clues, peer group behavior or “expert” guidance. Or the neuro-
physiological basis of its behavior might be “eagerly” changing in live action.
These are examples of situated, embodied cognition [124].
Human consciousness and free will are the most prominent emergent
phenomena. Without more ado, they could be viewed as pinnacles of delegated
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causation in the known cosmos. From a utilitarian perspective, consciousness
is a cognitive-behavioral characteristic that is able to intervene on (sometimes
particularly quiet) emotional, somatic drivers.
Can emergent systems near the corner Q in Figure 1 be interpreted as
“eagerly” seeking outside influence, even if the outside is presumably negligible?
In a sense, phase transitions delegate causality to dust particles, matter
irregularities. Most dramatically, we can consider the whole Universe with
no outside in principle. Can we then speculate that a collective behavior of
the system is seeking to externalize its statistical parameters, thermodynamic
“forces” [90], thereby meeting Mach’s principle [52], renormalization group
dynamics [5], [72, Ch. 3], Heisenberg’s indeterminacy, or an observer at the
“boundary”? Can dynamic novelty be a valid extension of a supervenience
basis? Does emergence itself reflect primordial ways of conceding causality?
At least, these speculations could be simulated by a chaotic, fractal or hardly
computable topology of the supervenience map, while the macro-dynamics
would be described by smooth functions. The consideration of emergence as
delegated causality is supported by the recently established correspondence
between the renormalization group in theoretical physics and the deep learning
approach in artificial intelligence [125], [77]; I elaborate this in §7.
The above questions ought to be addressed by theories of everything
[42]. Delegated causality gives an apparent taste of physical implications of
Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem [51], [28], [41]. It may even turn out to be a
reformulation of Go¨del’s incompleteness in causal terms.
The notion of delegated causality enhances rather than renounces the
reductionist paradigm by defining the causal role of critical, “edge of chaos”
systems. Possibilities of extravagant dynamics are wholly controlled by micro-
level arrangements. But dynamical actualization is contingent to particular
instabilities or input from the environment.
5 Biological causality
Biology is a great ground for testing explanatory power of delegated causality.
We can expect lots of elaborate causative interventions, provocations.
Mayr’s influential article [75] distinguishes proximate (mainly physiological)
and ultimate (mainly evolutionary) causes of biological phenomena. Contrary to
the reductionist template, the relatively more “teleological” level of explanation
by natural selection and adaptation is considered more fundamental in the
conventional (neo-Darwinian) Modern Synthesis. Physiological development is
guided by the genetic code, which in turn is pressured by natural selection.
By a rigid interpretation of Modern Synthesis, biological functionality and
organisms can be fully understood only from the evolutionary perspective, while
comprehension of ontogenic development is principally unnecessary for that.
This reduction of biological causes to statistical phenotype selection, genetic
adaptation and drift could be a deep reason of steady critique of the Modern
Synthesis [67], [121], [38], [94], [116].
7
(M1) (M2) (M3)
cell cardiovascular system supply of oxygen, nutrients
cardiovascular system heart blood circulation
tissues, organs endocrine system hormonal coordination
pathogenic infection immune system protection from diseases
host organism parasite parasitism
prey predator food chain
ecosystem invasive species ecological disruption
habitat niche construction adaptive alteration
of the environment
species population mountainous topography geographic speciation
heritable variation differential reproduction natural selection
gene pool sexual reproduction increased genetic variation
genetic drift punctuated equilibrium macro-evolution
chemical compounds enzyme catalyzed reaction
nucleic acids ribosome protein synthesis
allosteric enzymes inhibitory or activating regulation of metabolic
metabolites pathways
reactants with non-covalent bonding versatile stereospecific
complementary sites discrimination
oligomeric proteins stereospecific bonding spontaneous self-assembly
stereospecificity chemical potential information amplification
fertilized egg genome ontogenic development
genome gene regulatory network morphogenesis
stem cells variable gene expression cell differentiation
germ layers cell sorting, EMT tissue separation
Table 2: Biological examples of delegated causality analysis, as outlined in §3.
Laland and co-authors [65], [66] suggest that Mayr’s proximate-ultimate
dichotomy, although still vital, hinders a proper integration of evolution
and development, recognition of multiple sources of evolutionary novelty.
They advocate an intimate relation between developmental and evolutionary
processes, with the former able to influence evolutionary change through
phenotypic plasticity, developmental bias, epigenetic inheritance, behavioral
changes, and ecological interactions such as niche construction. This is a good
list to test scientific productivity of the delegated causality notion. Genes are
masters of causal intervention in the biological world, enjoying vast biochemical
infrastructure. But they themselves may be open to interventions. Feedback
from developmental and ecological conditions would be a powerful source of
adaptation, with diversified agencies and information forms as inevitable effects.
The methodology (M1)–(M3) in §3 of explicating delegated causation
is helpful to highlight interventional forces (M2) and signification (M3) of
interactions. This is illustrated in Table 2 by several physiological, ecological,
evolutionary, biochemical [80], and developmental [33], [87] examples. In many
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cases, the dual force of intervention dominates. But the central role of genes is
compellingly a cybernetic hub of delegation, as I recount again in the middle
of §7. In the biochemical context, the columns (M1), (M2) delineate Rosen’s
rendition [101] of Aristotle’s material and efficient causes, respectively. Systemic
closure of efficient causes is underscored by theories of biological autonomy [83],
[74]. In the context of causal stability and specificity [10], [128], the factor (M1)
tends to provide specificity, while (M2) furnishes stability and permissiveness.
The analysis (M1)–(M3) must offer more clarity than the proposal in [65], [66]
to employ a terminology of reciprocal causation. The polarity between Mayr’s
proximate and ultimate causes should rather stay.
Other biological disciplines where explicit analysis of delegated causation
ought to be useful are microbiology, symbiosis [73], communication [32].
The contentious subjects of group selection [123], multilevel selection [89],
evolvability [20], cooperation [88], altruism [108], longer term adaptation
might be greatly altered by the perspective of delegated causation as well.
The criticized theory of Wynne-Edwards [129] of territorial and hierarchical
organizations in various species regulating population growth becomes more
plausible, as game-theoretic explanations [21, Ch. 7] turn into proximate causes
relative to the “ultimate” adequacy between population size and resources.
Mayr [76, Ch. 8] acknowledges selection of cohesive social groups because their
fitness values can be disproportionately larger than the mean values of individual
fitness. This is reminiscent to the emergence principle that the whole is greater
than the sum of its parts.
6 Yin and Yang
Conceptions resonating with delegated causality can be found in Chinese
philosophy. Provocation of some experiential apprehension from readers looks
sensible or frankly unavoidable in this presentation. That being the case,
this section could be excused for being a little rhetorical. Certain cultural,
social parallels may be promptly triggered. Carefully evaluative readers are
encouraged to contain social, emotional charges and judgements.
The ancient Chinese concepts of Yin and Yang are customarily evoked to
affirm complementarity of opposing, interdependent forces. It is less widely
known that Yin and Yang are defined [91] as two concrete complementary
principles. The complementary harmony is better underscored by Taoism
[12], while the particular duality is more emphasized by Confucianism [102].
Recently, the Yin-Yang polarity has been interestingly related to holistic
causality [15], epistemology [132], [6], transformational change [61], [70], and
even microbiology [130], molecular biology [37].
One of the defining complementarities is that Yin is an abstraction of
passivity, inertness, while Yang is the active, generative principle. This
particular duality captures the contrast between mechanical dynamical systems
and emergent phenomena very well. A primed dynamical system of Definition
1 would be a passively reactive Yin, while any effective influence in Definition
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3 would be Yang. It seems fittingly convenient to adopt this language.
Paraphrasing an earlier statement, dynamic realization of Yang is beside the
main point. Yang is the novelty, emergence beyond Yin’s territory. Relative
to underlying Yin dynamics, Yang is a hero [11], a master, an artful trickster.
Yang is the magic of actualizing synergetic possibilities. Yang “opposes” entropy
increase by causative leadership, blocking unwelcome occurrences, forcing a
decisive turn of action, claiming the language of communication.
It is not necessary to assume supernatural causes to explain Yang mani-
festations. Yin’s ready anticipation of external perturbation and yielding to
self-precipitated pressures are pulling causative forces already. Yang is defined
by this anticipatory perception of Yin. We may refer to a finely triggered Yin’s
incipient reaction as Yin’s satisfaction. In some cases, this satisfaction may
be prompted straightforwardly; in other cases it may be an uncertain, rare
event. Both Yin and Yang of a particular interaction may evolve to sophisticated
cybernetic levels, meeting criteria of a broad market.
With many Yin agents available as amenable resources, Yang competition
to employ them emerges. Or who harnesses whom? Attribution of selection
powers is relative in multifaceted interactions of Yin and Yang. There is a
certain mutual inclusion of Yin and Yang, symbolized by the taijitu sign:
For example, a perceptual mechanism is Yin primed to be affected by the
environment. But Yang should have perceptual capabilities to recognize peer
Yin’s dynamic demand and address it.
The simplest mechanism of Yang (as external dynamics) is randomness. This
means, Yin allows chance to direct its dynamics. For example, divination rituals
were common in ancient human societies. In China of the Shang dynasty (circa
1600 BC− 1046 BC), oracle bones of ox or turtle were prominently used [58].
Other simple mechanism for Yang is competition. That is, Yin sets up a contest
who best performs or fakes a particular demand. Another manifestation of Yang
is information. Generally, Yang can be identified in processes that are called
“teleological” now and then. It is instructive to inspect Mayr’s classification
of five teleologies [76, Ch. 3]: “four of the five phenomena traditionally called
teleological can be completely explained by science, while the fifth one, cosmic
teleology, does not exist.” The similar list of Ellis [29], [30, Ch. 4] of five
downward causations is definitely germane as well.
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7 An integrated view
The two weighty theses in §4 relate delegated causality to emergence and Go¨del’s
incompleteness theorem. Emergence and Go¨del’s theorem are brought together
in the literature at times [99]. For example, Jorgensen and Svirezhev write
[55, p. 8]: “In accordance with Go¨del’s Theorem, the properties of order and
emergence cannot be observed and acknowledged from within the system, but only
by an outside observer.” It could be meaningful to consider emergent phenomena
and selection modes as physical, biological, or socionomic [97] manifestations
of Go¨del’s incompleteness. Monod’s concept of gratuity [80, Ch. IV] — i.e.,
independence between chemical qualities and function of biochemical processes
— can be similarly related to Go¨del’s theorem as well.
Delegated causality facilitates hierarchical dynamics and defines Nature’s
“joints” [104, §4] along which dynamical levels are fused. Higher levels impose
boundary conditions, constrains, selection regimes on dynamics of lower levels
[56]. This downward causation is enabled by critical, primed organization of the
lower levels. Intermediate “sub-wholes” in a dynamical hierarchy are Koestler’s
holons [62] — i.e., stable, integrated, largely autonomous, yet interactive
entities. They are both primed dynamical systems and interventional forces,
both consumers of energy and local sources of order. The constrains of a
dynamical level define distinct dynamics, bias, functionality, and a “behavior
code” of the holons.
Recently [77], [125], an equivalence between the renormalization technique
in condensed matter physics and the deep learning approach in artificial
intelligence was established. This reinforces the interpretation that micro-
dynamics of a phase transition (or a dissipative system such as Be´nard’s
cells [36], [110, p. 22–25]) is organizing itself to “explore” and adjust to
macro-boundaries. The scale-free dynamics extends mean free-path distances
and relaxation times of particle interactions by orders of magnitude, until
limiting macro-dimensions are eventually met. Causality delegation becomes
a paraphrase of this “deep learning” of macro-dimensions.
This enriched metaphorical context echoes the Santiago school view of living
systems as cognitive [74], sense making [112] systems, and Heylighen’s view [44]
of evolution and self-organization as cognitive processes. The action-centered
ontology [44] assigns intentional stance [22] to increasingly adaptive agents,
and (in essence) recognizes interventions as basic constituents of reality. But
the passive, incomplete kind of delegated causality should be recognized as well.
Deacon’s [24] cryptic notion of ententionality is relatable here, if it characterizes
being organized for some functioning. Elements of anticipation relate primed
dynamical systems, deep learning, and enactive [114, Ch. 8] cognition.
Primed dynamical systems and delegated causality ought to be discerned in
all phenomena and entities that are considered emergent or self-organizing. For
example, a living cell is predominantly a product of developmental processes that
delegate their coordination to genes. Biochemical reactions in the cytoplasm are
orchestrated by genes in the form of nucleic acids, but epigenetic switching,
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energy input from mitochondria, and nutrient flow determine the mode of
metabolism. Arrangements of tissues and organs are coordinated by genes
again, but the behavior and fate of organic “vehicles” [21, §12] are delegated
to the nervous system, sociality, tribal customs, or eventually to democratic
politics. Natural, symbiotic, artificial, and cultural selections blend into a rather
continuous spectrum of efficient causes.
Intuition on delegated causality can be further enhanced by reflecting on
many regarded modes of economic causality [48], [82], [115], [53]. Furthermore,
it is worth to reflect on causality of avalanches in self-organized critical systems
[4], [119], where (in theory) only a scale-free statistical distribution has a
predictive power. Scale-free dynamics in heterogeneous systems near the corner
P in Figure 1 can be self-reinforced by a few persistent motives of adaptation
throughout the scale expanse.
The Chinese concepts of Yin and Yang describe dynamical discontinuities
fittingly. The interaction between Yang’s constraints and Yin’s demand or
satisfaction should define a statistical partition for a relevant entropy tally,
and the semantics of what is caused by delegation. Yang’s contingency suggests
that universal principles of self-organization or non-equilibrium thermodynamics
(such as speculated laws of maximal entropy production [110]) would rather
describe potentialities.
Overwhelming interventions, catastrophes, dynamical collapses, black swans
[111] fit the presented context of delegated causality as Yang forces. Resignation
to them would not be called “delegation” in the common language. On the
other hand, ignoring predictably unsustainable trends (even if the timing and
operation of a likely resolution is highly uncertain) amounts to delegation
of responsibilities for consequences. For example, human conscious effort
to address a climate change [131] is a potentially significant causal factor.
Likelihood of a catastrophe indicates a primed dynamical system, to be
influenced possibly by its constituents.
The perspective of Yin and Yang applies to the cultural discord between
conservative and post-modernist [34] views in the United States. As the
American academic critic Bloom noted [7, p. 25], the post-modernist “relativity
of truth is not a theoretical insight but a moral postulate”. Post-modernism
can be viewed as celebration of Yin birthrights and subjective preferences,
as well as denial of Yang authority. Firstly however, limitation of resources
is not addressed operatively by the progressive optimism. That is left
implicitly to social, political, or financial [39] hierarchies, be them patriarchal
or not. Congruent resolution of oppression and sustaining social progress may
continue to be historical challenges [39, p. 183], especially under a prolonged
environmental stress. Secondly, Yang standards of leadership are in actuality
yet appreciated by the progressive electorate. This is evident from the 2016
US presidential election [100], where Hillary Clinton did not fully motivate her
expected voters.
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8 In conclusion
Common experience, biology [76], empirical causality [92], information measures
[46], [113] tell that downward causation apparently exist. The interpretation
of the ancient Chinese concept of Yin as a primed dynamical system intimates
that downward causation does exist in a very strong, virtually mechanical sense.
Instead of having “higher scales wrest the controls from lower scales” [126], the
lower scales can be organized to operatively concede a good deal of causality
to some higher scales. This possibility shifts the reductionistic paradigm in a
novel way [64]. The duality of delegated and interventional causations is subtly
eminent in Yin-Yang philosophy. Letting things go their way for a matched
balance is a part of this duality.
Co-evolution of agencies with expanding capabilities to provoke, perceive,
impose causal relations can lead to understandably tremendous consequences.
Conspicuously complex natural systems build up on interactions of delegated
causality. This must be it.
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